What is cognitive psychology? (W. Neisser)

After the First World War and until the 60s. Behaviorism and psychoanalysis (or their offshoots) were so dominant in American psychology that cognitive processes were almost completely forgotten. Not many psychologists have been interested in how knowledge is acquired. Perception - the most fundamental cognitive act - was studied mainly by a small group of researchers following the "Gestalt" tradition, as well as by some other psychologists interested in problems of measurement and physiology of sensory processes. J. Piaget and his colleagues studied cognitive development, but their work was not widely recognized. There were no attention tasks. Memory research never ceased completely, but it was focused primarily on the analysis of memorization of “nonsense syllables” in strictly defined laboratory situations, in relation to which only the results obtained were meaningful. As a result, in the eyes of society, psychology turned out to be a science dealing mainly with sexual problems, adaptive behavior and behavior control.

In the last few years the situation has changed radically. Mental processes again found themselves at the center of keen interest. A new field has emerged called cognitive psychology. She studies perception, memory, attention, pattern recognition, problem solving, psychological aspects of speech, cognitive development and many other problems that have been waiting their turn for half a century. Specialist journals, once laden with articles on animal behavior, are now filled with reports of cognitive experiments; Every now and then new journals appear: "Cognitive Psychology", "Cognition", "Memory and Cognition", "Perception and Psychophysics".

This course of events was due to several reasons, but the most important of them was, apparently, the emergence of electronic computers (computers). The point is not only that a computer facilitates experiments and makes it possible to thoroughly analyze the results obtained. It turned out that the operations performed by the electronic computer itself are in some respects similar to cognitive ones! processes. The computer receives information, manipulates symbols, stores elements of information in “memory” and retrieves them again, classifies input information, recognizes configurations, etc. Whether it does all this exactly as a person does seemed less important than whether that she is even capable of doing this. The advent of computers served as long-needed confirmation that cognitive processes are quite real, that they can be studied and even, perhaps, understood. Along with the computer, a new vocabulary and a new set of concepts related to cognitive activity also appeared; terms such as information, input, processing, encoding "subroutine" became commonplace. Some theorists even began to argue that all psychological theories should be explicitly formulated as machine programs. Others disagreed and continue to disagree, no one, however, he does not doubt the importance of computer analogies for modern psychology.

As the concept of information processing developed, the attempt to trace the flow of information through a “system” (i.e., the brain) became a primary goal in this new field. (This is exactly how I formulated this goal in my book Cognitive Psychology.) The rapid development of several new experimental methods proposed by Broadbent, Sperling, Sternberg and others gave rise to an intoxicating

feeling of progress. These techniques were just the beginning; they were followed by a veritable stream of new methods, most of which were based on precise temporal recording of stimuli and responses and completely eliminated the need for introspection. The proliferation of these ingenious and scientifically impeccable methods created the impression that cognitive psychology would be able to avoid all the pitfalls into which the old psychology fell - as many still tend to think so.

This optimism was apparently premature. The study of information processing is becoming more widespread and prestigious, but it is not yet associated with a theory of human nature that could find application outside the laboratory. And even in the laboratory, its basic postulates do not go beyond the computer model to which it owes its existence. How people act in the real world, how they interact with it, is still not taken into account. Indeed, the postulates underlying most modern work on information processing differ surprisingly little from those of 19th-century introspective psychology, despite the rejection of introspection as such.

If cognitive psychology continues to be so closely associated with this model, it will probably have to face difficulties. Insufficient ecological validity, indifference to cultural issues, and the absence of the main characteristics of perception and memory among the phenomena being studied, as they manifest themselves in everyday life, can turn such psychology into a narrow and uninteresting area of special research. There are already signs that this is exactly what is happening. The emergence of new techniques no longer inspires hope, but rather has a depressing effect. In his recent work, Allan Newell lists no less than 59 experimental procedures currently in use. He clearly doubts that another "generation" of this type of research and the development of even more methods will make us any wiser. 57 of the procedures on Newell's list involve artificial laboratory situations; The only techniques that have any degree of ecological validity involve playing chess and looking at the moon.

The only way to change this trend, I think, is to make cognitive research more "realistic" in several senses of the word. First, cognitive psychologists must make great efforts to understand cognitive activity as it occurs in the ordinary environment in the context of natural goal-directed activity. This does not mean stopping laboratory experiments, but focusing on ecologically more important variables than those that are readily available for experimental manipulation. Secondly, more attention will have to be paid to the details of the real world in which perceiving and thinking individuals live, as well as to the fine structure of the information provided to them by this world. Perhaps we spend too much effort on constructing hypothetical models of the psyche and do too little analysis of the environment with which it was formed to ensure interaction. Third, psychology must somehow account for the subtle and complex cognitive skills that people are actually capable of acquiring, and the fact that these skills undergo systematic change. A satisfactory theory of human cognitive activity can hardly be the result of experiments in which inexperienced subjects are forced to perform new and meaningless tasks. Finally, cognitive psychologists should be interested in how their work relates to more fundamental problems.

The purpose of this book is to show that such a task is quite feasible. Indeed, the corresponding work is already underway; there are many fruitful lines of research on which it can draw. The genetic studies of Piaget and Bauer, the work on perception of James and Eleanor Gibson, renewed interest in natural cognitive maps, in semantic theories of language and in observing language acquisition under normal conditions - these and many other studies can be considered as a contribution to meaningful cognitive psychology, and I will mainly rely on them in the future. are still missing, I will have to fill in the gaps with hypotheses and speculative reasoning. Even if some of my theoretical constructions turn out to be false, they may help others to propose their own more adequate hypotheses.

Although my goal is to consider all aspects of cognitive processes in the context of real life activities, most of the following discussions will relate only to perception. This is partly because perception is the fundamental cognitive activity that gives rise to all other activities. More importantly, however, perception is where cognitive activity and reality meet. I don't think most psychologists correctly understand the nature of this meeting. The dominant view is to exalt the perceiver: it is said that he processes, transforms, recodes, assimilates and generally gives form to what would otherwise be meaningless chaos. This approach may not be correct; the purpose of perception, like evolution, is undoubtedly to discover what the environment really is and to adapt to it.

Strongly objecting to the concept of information processing, James Gibson proposed a theory of perception in which internal mental processes play no role at all; the perceiver directly collects the information offered to him by the surrounding world. Gibson's conceptual framework for this theory is very constructive, and I will draw heavily on it. However, Gibson's view of perception also seems inadequate, if only because it says very little about the perceiver's contribution to the perceptual act. There must be some kind of structure in every perceiving organism that allows it to notice some aspects of the environment more than others, or to notice anything at all.

Scheme

There seems to be no better word than Bartlett's "schema" to designate the central cognitive structure of perception. (Bartlett was not entirely pleased with it, and I can say the same about myself.) Since this term has previously been widely used in a variety of meanings, I will try to define as clearly as possible what I mean by it. A schema is that part of the complete perceptual cycle that is internal to the perceiver, modified by experience, and specific in some way to what is perceived. The circuit receives information as soon as it reaches the sensory surfaces and changes under the influence of this information; the schema directs movements and exploratory activity, which opens up access to new information, which in turn causes further changes in the schema (see figure).

From a biological point of view, the circuit is part of the nervous system. This is some active set of physiological structures and processes; not a separate center in the brain, but a whole system, including receptors, afferents, central predictive elements and efferents. There must be some formations inside the brain itself, the activity of which could explain the organization of the circuit and its ability to be modified: associations of neurons, functional hierarchies, fluctuating electrical potentials, as well as other things still unknown to us. It is unlikely that such complex physiological activity can be described in terms of a unidirectional flow of information or a single temporal sequence of operations. It does not just start at the periphery and after some time reach a certain center; such activity must involve many different reciprocal and lateral connections. Nor can it begin at one particular point in time and end at another; the continuous functioning of various subsystems in one way or another overlaps each other, thereby giving rise to many “information repositories” of various types. It is important, although extremely difficult, to understand what these structures are from a physiological point of view. For now, however, my aim is simply to understand their connection with the perceptual cycle of which they are a part. Perception presupposes the real world as much as it presupposes the nervous system.

The functions of circuits can be illustrated through several analogies. If we consider a circuit as a system for receiving information, then it can in some sense be likened to what is called a format in computer programming language. Formats define the form in which information must be presented so that it can be interpreted in a consistent manner. Other information will either be ignored or lead to meaningless results. This preliminary specification, however, should not be overly strict. As already mentioned, the scheme is capable of operating at various levels of generality. You may be prepared to see "something" or "someone" or your brother-in-law George, or a smile on George's face, or even a cynical smile on George's face.

This scheme is not just a format; it also functions as a plan of the type that Miller, Galanter, and Pribram wrote about in their insightful book. Perceptual schemes are plans for collecting information about objects and events, obtaining new information to fill out the format. One of their most important functions in the case of vision is the direction of exploratory movements of the head and eyes. But the schema determines what is perceived even when there is no overt movement (listening is a good example of this), since any information is perceived only if there is an evolving format ready to receive it. Information that does not comply with this format remains unused. Perception by its very nature is selective.

The analogy between schemes, formats and plans is not complete. True formats and plans imply a sharp distinction between form and content that is not present in the case of outlines. The information that fills the format at one point in the cyclic process becomes part of the format at the next moment, determining how further information will be received. The scheme is not only the plan, but also the executor of the plan. It is a structure for action as well as a structure for action.

The activity of the circuit does not depend on any external energy source. If information of the desired type is available, the circuit will accept it and, perhaps, trigger actions aimed at finding new information. But the body has many circuits connected to each other in complex ways. Extensive schemes, as a rule, contain less extensive schemes. In such cases, extensive schemas often determine, or “motivate,” the activity of the schemas they contain. Motives are not alien forces that call into life usually passive systems; they are simply broader circuits that receive information and guide action on a larger scale. It should also be noted that the activities directed by the two schemes may conflict with each other or even be completely incompatible. What happens in such cases is called selective attention.

To use genetic analogies, the pattern at any given point in time resembles a genotype rather than a phenotype. It makes development possible in certain specific directions, but the specific nature of such development is determined only by interaction with the environment. It would be a mistake to identify a schema with what is perceived, just as it would be a mistake to identify a gene with any particular part of an adult organism. Perception may be said to be determined by schemas in the same sense in which the observable properties of an organism are determined by the corresponding genes; perception is the result of the interaction of schema and available information. In reality, perception is such interaction.

By constructing an anticipatory schema, the perceiver performs an act that includes both information from the environment and his own cognitive mechanisms. He himself changes as a result of receiving new information. This change is not just about creating an internal copy where there was nothing before; we are talking about changing the perceptual scheme, so that the next act will flow along a different channel. Because of such changes, and also because the world reveals an infinitely rich information texture to the qualified observer, two perceptual acts are never identical.

When discussing the concept of a schema, one cannot pass over in silence two important concepts that have at least a family resemblance to it. The first was proposed by Marvin Minsky and relates to the field of artificial intelligence and robotics, the others we owe to the sociologist Erwin Goffman. It is curious that both used the same word frame. Although at first glance these concepts have little in common, they both reflect an attempt to emphasize the decisive role of context and meaning in cognitive activity... Minsky (in whose laboratory these works were mainly carried out) nevertheless came to the conclusion that adequate recognition and descriptions of real scene situations will never be possible based on currently received input signals alone. He believes that for each new situation the computer must have a frame or hierarchy of frames ready that anticipates the main points of what is about to appear. If a computer examines a room, it should expect to find walls, doors, windows, furniture, etc.; Only in this way can one interpret the available information, which otherwise turns out to be fundamentally ambiguous. Minsky believes that in the absence of information, such a system will make an "a priori signification", such as postulating the existence of a wall on the right side, even if it has not received any relevant evidence...

The concept of information gathering is central to both my argument and Gibbon's... The perceiver is also a physical system in contact with the optical flow. The state of such a system is partly determined by the structure of this flow; this means that information is being transmitted to the system. When this happens, that is, when the nervous system highlights the pattern of light, we say that the information has been collected by the perceiver. If the information itself - those aspects of the optical structure that influenced the perceiver - specifies the properties of real objects, perception of these properties and objects takes place.

The collection of information requires an appropriate perceptual system - appropriate in the sense that its state can be usefully changed by contact with structured light. It is often argued that this system (called here a circuit) must process the information available to it. This term can be misleading. The information as such does not change, since it was already contained in the light. The circuit collects information, changes it, uses it.

Schemes are formed as experience accumulates. The collection of information is initially crude and inefficient, as is the research activity that ensures the continuity of the perceptual cycle. Only through perceptual learning do we acquire the ability to perceive increasingly subtle aspects of the environment. The patterns that exist at any given moment are the product of individual life experience, as well as the actual unfolding cycle itself. Theories that do not take development into account cannot seriously be considered theories of human cognitive processes.

The fact of perceptual learning assumes that at each moment of time, A 1, the state of the circuit is somehow connected with its state at the previous moment, A 0. According to the definition of information transfer, one could say that information was “transmitted” from A 0 to A 1. However, it will be much clearer if we say that the information was “saved” or “retained.” Thus, schemas allow us not only to perceive current events, but also to retain information about events that took place in the past.

The concept of information storage plays a key role in most modern theories of memory. One often hears the statement that the functioning of the brain resembles, in essence, the work of a large library search engine. From this point of view, traces left by the events of an individual's past life are accumulated on library shelves (in long-term memory) and are retrieved from time to time for the purpose of conscious review. If the librarian cannot detect them, then forgetting occurs. Whatever the merits of this approach, I have something different in mind here. An individual who has a schema that is currently inactive cannot be considered the owner of a specific mental property. He is just an organism with certain potential capabilities. Inactive circuits are not objects, but only aspects of the structure of the nervous system. Although they retain information in the special sense of the word, it... is not collected in the same way as information contained in light. The fact of conservation is manifested only in the specifics of anticipation that accompanies the use of the scheme (...)

There is no period in a person’s life when he is completely devoid of patterns. A newborn, opening his eyes, sees a world infinitely rich in information; he must be at least partially ready to begin the perceptual cycle and prepare for subsequent information.

In this case, we must recognize that even the youngest children have some innate perceptual equipment - not only the senses, but also the neural circuits to control them. At the same time, we don't need to admit too much. The old Platonic idea that all meaning is innate seems completely inadequate to the changing conditions of human life. People must understand their world; they do not know in advance what he will be like, and they will never know everything about him, no matter how smart and insightful they are. In my opinion, babies know how to find their way and become familiar with their surroundings, and how to organize the information they receive in a way that helps them gain more of it. Even this knowledge is very limited, but this is quite enough for a start.

There is a lot of experimental evidence to support this. Infants exhibit many different information-gathering behaviors; from the very beginning they are involved in the implementation of cyclical perceptual activity: they look in the direction of sound, follow objects with their eyes and reach for things they see (...)

Perceptual development does not occur automatically, under the influence of innate mechanisms, regardless of the environment. The cycle of anticipation and collection of information that connects the perceiver with the world can only develop along the paths offered by the world (...)

In a normal environment, most perceptible objects and events have meaning. They provide a variety of possibilities for action: they indicate what has already happened or is about to happen; they are naturally included in a larger context and have an individuality that goes beyond their elementary physical properties These meanings can and do be perceived. We see that this facial expression is a cynical grin, or that the object on the table is a pen, or that there is a door under the sign "Exit" Reading or listening, we.

we perceive the meanings of words and sentences, the course of reasoning and shades of emotions. Such perception often appears direct in the sense that we are aware of the meanings as. without noticing the physical parts from which they are built. At the very least, we often fail to describe these details (how to define a cynical grin?) and quickly forget them, even if they could potentially be pointed out (did the previous sentence begin with the words “This perception...” or “This perception...” ?).

If perception is a cyclic activity of the kind shown in Fig. 1, there is no need to attribute meaning either only to the environment or only to the perceiver, and also to be surprised that meaning is realized before (or in the absence of) the physical characteristics on which it obviously depends. Perceiving any aspect of an object—whether it's the meaning of your brother-in-law George's smile or the relative length of his eyebrows and mouth—takes time. Your circuitry develops differently in each of these cases, and you make different exploratory eye movements to obtain the relevant information. In one case, you look for and find additional signs of a smile on the face, certain movements that characterize the dynamics of a smile over time, look for and find (over a longer period of time) some actions of George that further confirm the presence of the corresponding feeling. In another case, you might be looking for information that clarifies, for example, whether the corners of his mouth actually pull closer to the edge of his face than his eyebrows. Whether you see the meaning of a smile or just its shape depends on what perceptual cycle you are involved in, and not on any single momentary signal and its processing in your head. Logically, none of the considered types of perception (and there are an infinite number of such types in this sense) precedes the other. The perception of geometric properties does not occur at a lower level of processing than the perception of meaning; there is also no reason to believe; that it occurs earlier in the child’s perceptual development.

Winner of the Guggenheim and Sloan awards. He made a significant contribution to the development of cognitive psychology in the second half of the 20th century.

Biography

Born in Kiel, Germany. He moved to the USA in 1931. In 1950 he received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and a master's degree from Swarthmore College. In 1956 he received his doctorate from Harvard. Subsequently he taught at Brandeis, Cornell, and Emory universities.

Contribution

In 1976, Neisser wrote the work “Cognition and Reality,” where he formulated the main problems of the discipline. First, he expressed dissatisfaction with the excessive presence of information processing models in cognitive psychology. Secondly, he was inclined to believe that cognitive psychology is not able to effectively solve everyday problems and features of human behavior. Neisser blamed this situation on the almost complete focus of research on laboratory experimental methods, which presuppose low external (ecological) validity of the results obtained. Third, Neisser expressed support for James and Eleanor Gibson's theory of direct perception. Neisser notes that cognitive psychology has little chance of realizing its potential without a close study of the Gibsons' work on perception. The latter argued that understanding human behavior first of all involves a careful analysis of the information that is available to any perceiving organism. The work was published in Russian in 1981.

In 1998, Neisser, based on the results of his work on the commission of the American Psychological Association, published a work Rising Curve: Long-term gains in IQ and related measures.

Publications

Neisser U. Cognition and reality. - M.: Progress, 1981.
Neisser, U. (1967) Cognitive Psychology. Appleton-Century-Crofts New York
Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology. W. H. Freeman
Neisser, U. (1998) The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures. American Psychological Association

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See what “Nisser” is in other dictionaries:

NISSER- (Neisser) Ulrich (b. 1928) American psychologist of German origin. Specialist in the field of experimental, cognitive and environmental psychology, philosophy of psychology. Educated at Harvard University (BA, 1950), at Swarthmore... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology and Pedagogy

- (born 1928) American psychologist, one of the founders of cognitive psychology. In 1933, his family emigrated to the USA. In 1950 he graduated from Harvard University with a bachelor's degree, in 1952 he defended his master's thesis at Swarthmore... ... Psychological Dictionary

Neisser Ulrich- (born 1928, Kiel) American psychologist, one of the founders of cognitive psychology. Biography. In 1933, his family emigrated to the USA. He first studied physics at Harvard University, then switched to psychology. I took a course on... ... Great psychological encyclopedia

Ulrik Neisser Date of birth: December 8, 1928 (1928 12 08) Place of birth: Kiel, Germany Date of death: February 17, 2012 (2012 02 17 ... Wikipedia

- (p. 1928). Neisser became widely known thanks to his three books: “Cognitive psychology” contributed to the development of this field, “Cognition and reality” was an attempt to give it a new... ... Psychological Encyclopedia

A continuous sequence of internal figurative representations that arise in the cognitive system of living beings, reproducing sensory recognizable objects, events, states, etc. Initially, human knowledge is of a sensual nature.… … Philosophical Encyclopedia

The image of an early perceived object or phenomenon (P. memory, recollection), as well as the image created by the productive imagination; form of feelings. reflection in the form of visual knowledge. In contrast to perception, P. rises above the immediate means... Philosophical Encyclopedia

performance- REPRESENTATION is a visual sensory image of objects and situations of reality, given to consciousness and, in contrast to perception, accompanied by a feeling of the absence of what is represented. There are P. of memory and imagination. Most... ...

ecological theory of perception- ECOLOGICAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION the concept of perception formulated by the famous Amer. psychologist J. Gibson in the 70s. 20th century This concept, which gave rise to the “Gibsonians” movement in the psychology of perception, and then the “neo-Gibsonians”, in... ... Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

Ulrik Neisser (1928)

Ulrik Neisser was born in Germany, in Kiel. His parents brought him to the United States at the age of three. He initially studied physics at Harvard University. Impressed by the brilliant lectures of one of the young professors named George Miller, Neisser decided that physics was not for him and switched to studying psychology. He took a course in the psychology of communication from Miller and became familiar with the basics of information theory. Its development was also influenced by Koffka’s book “Principles of Gestalt Psychology.”

Receiving a bachelor's degree from Harvard in 1950. Neisser continued his education at Swarthmore College under the guidance of the representative of Gestalt psychology, Wolfgang Köhler. He returned to Harvard to obtain his doctorate, where he successfully defended his dissertation in 1956.

Despite his growing commitment to the cognitive approach, Neisser saw no other path to an academic career other than behaviorism. He wrote: “This is what you had to learn: at that time, no psychological phenomenon could be considered really existing unless you could demonstrate it on laboratory mice ... This seemed very funny to me” (quoted in: Baars. 1986. P .275).

Neisser found behaviorism not only amusing, but also slightly<ненормальным>, when he was lucky enough to get his first academic position at Brandeis University, where the psychology department was headed by Abraham Maslow. During this period, Maslow himself was gradually moving away from behaviorism and reflecting on the foundations of the humanistic approach. Maslow failed to persuade Neisser to humanistic psychology, just as he failed to make humanistic psychology a “third force” in psychology. However, acquaintance with him pushed Neisser towards cognitive research. (Neisser subsequently insisted that it was cognitive psychology that constituted that very “third force”, and not humanistic psychology at all).

In 1967, Neisser published a book called Cognitive Psychology. This book was destined to “open a new field of research” (Goleman. 1983. P. 54). Neisser noted that the book is personal in nature, it is an attempt to define himself as a psychologist, what he is or would like to be. The book also provided a definition of a new approach in psychology. The book was extremely popular, and at one point Neisser found himself being called the “father” of cognitive psychology. In reality, he had no intention of founding a new school. But nevertheless, this book significantly contributed to the departure of psychology from behaviorism and its turning to problems of cognition.

Neisser defined cognition as the process by which “incoming sensory data undergoes transformation, reduction, processing, accumulation, reproduction and is subsequently used... Cognition is present in any act of human activity” (Neisser. 1967. P. 4). Thus, cognitive psychology deals with sensations, perception, imagination, memory, thinking and all other types of mental activity.

Nine years after the publication of his landmark book, Neisser published another work entitled “Cognition and Reality” (1976). In this work, he expressed dissatisfaction with the apparent narrowing of the position of cognitive psychology, which relies too much on the study of artificial laboratory situations at the expense of the study of real-life cases. He felt disappointed that cognitive psychology, since its inception, had made only modest contributions to the understanding of how human cognition actually works.

As a result, being one of the key figures in the formation of the cognitive movement, Neisser himself became its outspoken and outspoken critic. He began to question the cognitive movement in the same way that he had previously criticized behaviorism. He is currently affiliated with Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. Before that, he worked for 17 years at Cornell University, where E. B. Titchener's dissected brain was kept near his office.

W. Neisser(b. 1928) published the book “Cognitive Psychology” in 1967, in which he outlined the main provisions of this direction.

In 1960, Miller and Bruner created the Center for Cognitive Research at Harvard University. Contrasting their work with behavioral research that was still prevalent at that time, the Center studied various cognitive processes - perception, memory, thinking, speech, including an analysis of their genesis. It was the genetic aspect of cognition, as shown above, that became the leading one for Bruner.

For Miller and other cognitive scientists, the priority remained the focus on analyzing the functioning of already formed processes and their structural analysis. In parallel, work began on the study of artificial intelligence, and in some cases the simplification of models came to the detriment of the analysis of the human cognitive system.

Cognitive psychology owes awareness of its subject and method to Neisser and his book, which was already mentioned above. He, like Piaget, proved the decisive role of the cognitive component in the structure of the psyche and in the activities of people. Having outlined the main range of problems of the new direction, Neisser defined cognition as a process by which incoming sensory data undergoes various types of transformation for the convenience of their accumulation, reproduction and further use. He suggested that cognitive processes are best studied by modeling the flow of information through various stages of transformation. To explain the essence of the ongoing processes, he proposed terms such as “iconic memory”, “echoic memory”, “pre-tuning processes”, “figurative synthesis”, and developed methods for studying them - visual searchAndselective observation.

Initially, he was also involved in research on “artificial intelligence,” but then moved away from this work and criticized some of his colleagues for focusing too much on artificial intelligence, which narrowed the effectiveness of cognitive psychology. This position of Neisser was supported by materials he obtained while studying the ecology of perception. He came to the conclusion that when studying artificial models of information processing (for example, operator activity), the abundance of information stimuli that a person receives in natural information-rich conditions is underestimated. These thoughts of Neisser were reflected in his new book “Cognition and Reality” (1976). The theoretical considerations expressed in it were supported by experiments he conducted (for example, when studying divided and selective attention).

The computer metaphor, which, as mentioned, is very common in this approach, has formed the basis of work in which computer programs serve as a model for understanding human information processing. The positive thing here is the fact that intelligence is not considered as a set of sequential, often loosely connected stages or stages of information processing, as was the case in traditional psychology, in which it was believed that after sensation comes perception, then memory, thinking, etc. The new approach considers a complex system that has a complex structure, and the hierarchy is built on types of information processing and depends on the tasks at hand.

Numerous studies conducted by scientists within the new direction were aimed at studying this structure and its activities in different situations. Among their works, it is necessary to note the study of those transformations that occur with sensory information from the moment it hits the receptor until the response is received. At the same time, data were obtained proving that sensory sensitivity is a continuous function and there is no threshold in the proper sense of the word, since the threshold for detecting a signal depends on many factors. Based on these materials, it was developed signal detection theory. This information theory, which influenced all subsequent work in cognitive psychology, was also originally formulated on the basis of data obtained from the study of perception. The leading contribution to its development was made by K. Shannon, who created a mathematical model of a universal communications system that explains the mechanisms for identifying various signals.

When studying the models that ensure a person’s ability to recognize signals from the outside world, scientists relied on data from Gestalt psychology, which were confirmed at a new level of analysis of the perception process. These works echo the works of Russian scientists A.V. Zaporozhets and L.A. Wenger, who studied the role of sensory standards in the perception of the environment.

As a result of research, the structural components (blocks) of intelligence were identified, and types of memory such as short-termAndlong-term. At the same time, in the experiments of D. Sperling, who changed Neisser’s method for studying iconic memory, it was shown that the volume of short-term memory is practically unlimited. The work of Broadbent, Norman and other scientists showed that a kind of filter that selects the signals needed at the moment is attention, which has acquired a completely new interpretation in cognitive psychology.

The materials obtained from the study of attention and memory served as an incentive for the study unconscious, the approach to which in cognitive psychology differs significantly not only from the psychoanalytic one, but also from the approach of humanistic psychology. The unconscious contains an unconscious part of the information processing program, which is activated already in the first stages of perception of new material. Studying the content of long-term memory, as well as the selective reaction of a person during simultaneous conflicting presentation of information (for example, one information to the right ear, and another to the left), reveals the role of unconscious processing. In this case, we are talking about the fact that from the countless amount of information received per unit of time, the cognitive system selects and brings to consciousness only those signals that are most important at the moment. The same selection occurs when transferring information into long-term memory. From this point of view, some scientists believe that almost all signals, all influences of the external environment are imprinted in our psyche, but not all of them are realized at the moment, and some are never realized due to their low intensity and insignificance for life, but not in any way the strength of their asociality or incompatibility with morality, as Freud believed.

Speaking about the development of the cognitive direction, it is necessary to mention personality construct theoriesG. Kelly(1905-1967). This theory, although it stands apart, is essentially close to the basic principles of cognitive psychology. Kelly's view, which viewed man as an explorer seeking to understand, interpret, and control himself and the world around him, largely stimulated cognitive psychology's interest in the process by which people understand and process information about their world.

Kelly formulated his ideas in the late 50s, anticipating the work of Neisser and Miller by almost 10 years. After receiving his doctorate from the University of Edinburgh in 1931, he began his teaching career, combining it with psychotherapy. Particularly fruitful for him were the last years spent at Brandeis University, where he had the opportunity to devote more time to his research.

His theory is based on the concept constructive alternativeism, based on which Kelly argued that each event is comprehended and interpreted differently by different people, since each person has a unique system constructs(schemes). Constructs have certain properties (range of applicability, permeability, etc.), based on combinations of which Kelly identified different types personal constructs. By saying that "A is what a person explains as A," he argued that there is no such thing about which there cannot be more than one opinion. The difference in opinions is explained by different schemes (constructs) with which a person operates. Thus, it is the intellectual processes that lead in a person’s activity.

Claiming that every person is a researcher, Kelly, of course, did not identify this activity with the real research of scientists. The point was that people constantly build their image of reality using an individual system of categorical scales - personal constructs. Based on this image, hypotheses about future events are built. If the hypothesis is not confirmed, the person, to a greater or lesser extent, rebuilds his system of constructs in order to increase the adequacy of the following predictions. In other words, unlike psychoanalysts who argue that people are focused on the past, or from Rogers, who spoke about the present, Kelly emphasized that the future is what matters most to a person.

Arguing that personality is identical to the personal constructs that a given person uses, Kelly believed that this eliminates the need for additional explanation of the reasons for his actions, since the leading motive is precisely the desire to predict the future.

The main postulate of Kelly's theory states that mental activity is determined by how a person predicts (constructs) future events, that is, his thoughts and actions are aimed at predicting the situation. At the same time, Kelly emphasized that a holistic approach to a person is necessary, and not an analysis of individual actions or experiences. From this postulate he made 11 conclusions that explain how the system of constructs functions, how it changes and changes the social situation around a person.

Human constructs are organized into a certain hierarchical system, which is not rigid, since not only the relationships of dominance-subordination change, but also the constructs themselves. Based on these provisions, Kelly developed methodological principle of repertory grids.Them and his followers created a large number of methods for diagnosing the characteristics of the subject’s individual construction of reality, as well as the psychotherapeutic method of fixed roles.

(2012-02-17 ) (83 years old)

Ulrik Neisser(English) Ulric Neisser; December 8, Kiel, Germany - February 17) - American psychologist, member of the US National Academy of Sciences. Lecturer at Cornell University. Winner of the Guggenheim and Sloan awards. He made a significant contribution to the development of cognitive psychology in the second half of the 20th century.

Biography

Born in Kiel, Germany, in the family of a prominent economist of Jewish origin, Hans Philip Neisser (1895-1975), a native of Breslau. He moved to the USA in 1931. In 1950 he received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and a master's degree from Swarthmore College. In 1956 he received his doctorate from Harvard. Subsequently he taught at Brandeis, Cornell, and Emory universities.

Contribution

In 1998, Neisser, based on the results of his work on the commission of the American Psychological Association, published a work Rising Curve: Long-term gains in IQ and related measures.

Publications

Neisser U. Cognition and reality. - M.: Progress, 1981.
Neisser, U. (1967) Cognitive Psychology. Appleton-Century-Crofts New York
Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology. W. H. Freeman
Neisser, U. (1998) The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures. American Psychological Association

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“Yes, it was death. I died - I woke up. Yes, death is awakening! - his soul suddenly brightened, and the veil that had hitherto hidden the unknown was lifted before his spiritual gaze. He felt a kind of liberation of the strength previously bound in him and that strange lightness that has not left him since then.
When he woke up in a cold sweat and stirred on the sofa, Natasha came up to him and asked what was wrong with him. He did not answer her and, not understanding her, looked at her with a strange look.
This was what happened to him two days before the arrival of Princess Marya. From that very day, as the doctor said, the debilitating fever took on a bad character, but Natasha was not interested in what the doctor said: she saw these terrible, more undoubted moral signs for her.
From this day on, for Prince Andrei, along with awakening from sleep, awakening from life began. And in relation to the duration of life, it did not seem to him slower than awakening from sleep in relation to the duration of the dream.

There was nothing scary or abrupt in this relatively slow awakening.
His last days and hours passed as usual and simply. And Princess Marya and Natasha, who did not leave his side, felt it. They did not cry, did not shudder, and lately, feeling this themselves, they no longer walked after him (he was no longer there, he left them), but after the closest memory of him - his body. The feelings of both were so strong that the external, terrible side of death did not affect them, and they did not find it necessary to indulge their grief. They did not cry either in front of him or without him, but they never talked about him among themselves. They felt that they could not put into words what they understood.
They both saw him sink deeper and deeper, slowly and calmly, away from them somewhere, and they both knew that this was how it should be and that it was good.
He was confessed and given communion; everyone came to say goodbye to him. When their son was brought to him, he put his lips to him and turned away, not because he felt hard or sorry (Princess Marya and Natasha understood this), but only because he believed that this was all that was required of him; but when they told him to bless him, he did what was required and looked around, as if asking if anything else needed to be done.
When the last convulsions of the body, abandoned by the spirit, took place, Princess Marya and Natasha were here.
– Is it over?! - said Princess Marya, after his body had been lying motionless and cold in front of them for several minutes. Natasha came up, looked into the dead eyes and hastened to close them. She closed them and did not kiss them, but kissed what was her closest memory of him.
“Where did he go? Where is he now?..”

When the dressed, washed body lay in a coffin on the table, everyone came up to him to say goodbye, and everyone cried.
Nikolushka cried from the painful bewilderment that tore his heart. The Countess and Sonya cried out of pity for Natasha and the fact that he was no more. The old count cried that soon, he felt, he would have to take the same terrible step.
Natasha and Princess Marya were also crying now, but they were not crying from their personal grief; they wept from the reverent emotion that gripped their souls before the consciousness of the simple and solemn mystery of death that had taken place before them.